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Abstract: 
 
The recent finance company collapses have highlighted the need for improved director accountability. However where 
is the appropriate point to draw the line, which if crossed, imposes criminal liability? The Financial Markets Conduct 
Bill and the Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill both attempt to redefine when criminal liability will 
attach to directors. By assessing the proposed changes in the light of two recent cases, it can be seen that under the 
proposed changes, directors have the potential to be found criminally liable for less than dishonest behaviour. This 
raises the issue of whether criminal liability is appropriate in regards to directors’ actions, or whether a civil liability 
scheme would be more appropriate. This paper looks at the current law and the proposed changes to directors’ liability, 
and by considering the situations of two failed finance companies, attempts to draw conclusions as to the effects of 
such changes.  
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I Introduction 
 
Two Bills in Parliament have the potential to greatly change the criminal system in which 
liability for directors is determined. This begs the question of whether such changes will 
be an improvement on the existing regime. It also raises the inquiry of whether such Bills 
will achieve the purposes which they set out to accomplish. This paper attempts to find 
answers to these questions by looking at the current law, as interpreted by two recent 
cases and the potential effects of the proposed changes. 
 
The Financial Markets Conduct Bill (FMC Bill) and the Companies and Limited 
Partnerships Amendment Bill (CLPA Bill) look to radically change the current criminal 
framework. The effects of these Bills can be determined by assessing them in the light of 
actual scenarios. Tallentire v R
1
 (Tallentire) and Jeffries v R
2
 (Jefferies) are both cases 
decided under the current law, both involving criminal liability for finance company 
directors. They show the current system’s purpose, and also the problems associated with 
it. How would these cases have been decided if the proposed changes had been in force at 
the relevant time? An answer to whether the changes will be beneficial to directors, 
  
1
 Tallentire v R [2012] NZCA 610, [2013] 1 NZLR 548. 
2
 William Patrick Jeffries v R [2013] NZCA 188. 
4 
 
whether problems will be solved or whether the changes will create further issues and 
concerns for directors, can be determined from this analysis.  
 
This paper will look at the Tallentire and Jeffries decisions, and then summarise the 
proposed changes to the law regarding company directors’ liabilities. By applying the 
proposed changes to these two factual situations, a view can be gained as to the likely 
outcome and effects of the two Bills. Through looking closely at the proposed changes 
and their potential effects, this paper will attempt to draw conclusions on questions asked 
above.  
 
II Decisions under current law 
A Tallentire v R 
This case concerned the prosecution of three directors of Capital + Merchant Finance 
Limited (Capital) after that company’s collapse. Each director was found guilty of theft 
by a person in a special relationship under s 220 of the Crime Act 1961.
3
 
 
Capital was a finance company which made loans for property development. It financed 
these loans by borrowing funds from the public, and in order to do this, was obliged to 
appoint a trustee.
4
 The collection and use of the funds was governed by a debenture trust 
deed. Clause 6(2) of the trust deed stated that Capital was restricted from entering into 
any related party transaction without the prior consent of the trustee, unless the 
transaction was in the ordinary course of business. Prior to the collapse of Capital, the 
company under took three relevant transactions, described in the case as Numeria 1 and 
the Clyde transactions.  
 
The complex transactions served the purpose of personally benefiting the three directors. 
All three transactions were related party transactions under the trust deed, for which the 
consent of the trustee was not sought.  
  
3
 R v Douglas [2012] NZHC 1746.  
4
 Securities Act 1978, s 33(2). 
5 
 
 
The three directors, Douglas, Nichols and Tallentire were charged under s 220 of the 
Crimes Act 1961. This section applies to any person who has control of property on terms 
that the person knows requires them to deal with the property in accordance with the 
requirements of any person.
5
 It states that every person to whom the section applies 
commits theft if they intentionally deal with the property otherwise than in accordance 
with those requirements.
6
 This was the first time that finance company directors had 
faced s 220 charges arising from alleged breaches of trust deed covenants.
7
 
 
Wylie J in the High Court decision set out the elements of the offence as follows:
8
 
 
(a) Did the accused have control over property? 
 
(b) Was the property in the control of the accused, in circumstances that required 
him to deal with the property, or any proceeds arising from the property, in 
accordance with the requirements of any other person? 
 
(c) Did the accused know of those circumstances? And, 
 
(d) Did the accused intentionally deal with the property, or any proceeds of the 
property, otherwise than in accordance with those requirements? 
 
Messrs Douglas and Nichols were held to have control over the property in regards to 
both the Numeria 1 transaction
9
 and the Clyde transactions.
10
 Mr Tallentire was only held 
to have control over the property in regards to the Clyde transactions.
11
The trust deed 
contained restrictions on how investor funds could be used, and because of this, the 
  
5
 Crimes Act 1961, s 220(1). 
6
 Crimes Act 1961, s 220(2). 
7
 Tallentire v R, above n 1, at [3]. 
8
 R v Douglas, above n 3, at [149]. 
9
 Tallentire v R, above n 1, at [83]. 
10
 At [104]. 
11
 At [83], [104] and [120]. 
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second element was satisfied.
12
 It was conceded that Messrs Douglas and Nicholls were 
well aware of the related party transaction restrictions.
13
 There was also sufficient 
evidence to show Mr Tallentire knew of the relevant requirements.
14
 
 
The intention element of the fourth requirement was held to mean that the Crown had to 
prove intention to enter into the transaction and that the accused intended to breach the 
relevant requirement.
15
 Stevens J in the Court of Appeal upheld the decisions of Wylie J; 
finding that the directors did in fact intend to breach the requirements of the trust deed, 
such transactions were not in the ordinary course of business and that resultantly, they 
were guilty under s 220.
16
 
 
Having control of investor funds, whilst knowing you must use the funds in accordance 
with a trust deed, and intentionally breaching a trust deed requirement was established as 
constituting a criminal offence under s 220. The Crown did not need to prove any 
dishonesty.
17
 
 
B Jefferies v R 
 
This case concerned the prosecution of the directors of the failed finance company, 
Lombard Finance and Investments Limited (Lombard). The directors were prosecuted 
under s 58 of the Securities Act 1978 for distributing a prospectus and advertisements 
containing untrue statements. 
 
Due to difficult economic conditions, notably the failure of a number of other finance 
companies, Lombard was experiencing serious liquidity issues. The company had been 
experiencing a downward trend in its cash position, relying on loan managers’ assurances 
  
12
 At [84]. 
13
 At [84]. 
14
 At [105]. 
15
 At [58]. 
16
 At [137]. 
17
 R v Douglas, above n 3, at [249]. 
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that although loan repayments were delayed, they were not irrecoverable. The directors 
were of the view that despite the known liquidity pressures the company was facing, they 
could nevertheless continue raising funds from the public. The way in which they did this 
was by issuing an amended prospectus and investment statement. 
 
Section 58(3) states that where a registered prospectus that includes an untrue statement 
is distributed, every person who signed the prospectus commits an offence.
18
 Section 
58(1) is a similar charge; where an advertisement for securities is distributed containing 
an untrue statement, and the issuer is a body, all directors of the body at the time of 
distribution commit an offence.
19
 The charge is a strict liability offence; the Crown is not 
required to prove any criminal intent on the part of those charged.
20
 A statement in a 
registered prospectus or in an advertisement can be deemed to be untrue if there is a 
material omission.
21
 In both the amended prospectus and investment statement that were 
issued, information regarding the liquidity problems was not sufficiently included. The 
court accepted that such an omission of liquidity concerns in the offer documents was 
material to investors and that without such information, the documents were misleading 
and untrue for the purposes of the Securities Act.
22
 
 
A statutory defence to a charge under s 58 is that the person has reasonable grounds to 
believe, and did believe, up to the time of the distribution, that the statement in the offer 
document was true.
23
 Here, the defendants argued that they thought the combined effect 
of the statements in the offer documents rendered the statements true in respect to the 
company’s liquidity. The Court of Appeal held that although the directors did believe that 
the amended offer documents were true despite the omitted information, such a belief 
was not held on objectively reasonable grounds.
24
 The view that monitoring the accuracy 
of loan repayments was a matter in which investors can rely on the directors’ judgment 
  
18
 Securities Act 1978, s 58(3). 
19
 Securities Act 1978, s 58(1). 
20
 William Patrick Jeffries v R , above, n 2, at [20]. 
21
 Securities Act 1978, s 55(a)(ii). 
22
 William Patrick Jeffries v R, above n 2, at [171]. 
23
 Securities Act 1978, ss 58(2) and 58(4). 
24
 William Patrick Jeffries v R, above n 2, at [189]-[191]. 
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for, was unreasonable. This could therefore not provide a reasonable basis for the 
directors to believe the offer documents were true.
25
  
 
An appeal of the decision has been lodged with the Supreme Court, based on similar 
alleged errors of law that were argued in the Court of Appeal.
26
 It remains possible that 
the guilty verdicts could be overturned. Currently however, omitting information relating 
to known material liquidity pressures on a company in disclosure documents constitutes 
an offence under s 58(3).  
 
 
III Proposed Changes 
A Financial Markets Conduct Bill 
 
Currently proceeding through Parliament is a Bill which aims to reform the regulation of 
New Zealand’s financial markets. The Bill would repeal a number of pieces of securities 
legislation and replace them with a unified code.
27
  
 
Amongst the reforms the FMC Bill aims to enact are a number of changes to liability, 
which are particularly relevant to finance company directors. The Bill repeals the current 
prospectus/investment statement regime and instead requires that a product disclosure 
statement (PDS) be prepared when regulated offers are made to potential investors, and 
further material disclosures must be made on a register of securities.
28
 An offeror must 
not offer or continue to offer financial products under a regulated offer if there is a 
  
25
 At [189]. 
26
 David Farrar “The Lombard appeal to the Supreme Court” (4 July 2013) KiwiBlog 
<www.kiwiblog.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Lombard-Appln-Leave-to-Appeal-SC-2-July-
2013.pdf>. 
27
 John McSoriley “Bills Digest No 1963” (03 April 2012) New Zealand Parliament 
<http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/legislation/bills/digests/50PLLaw19631/financial-markets-conduct-
bill-2011-bills-digest-no-1963>.  
28
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 35. 
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statement or omission in the PDS or the register entry that is false or misleading or is 
likely to mislead.
29
  
 
Under the Bill, if an offeror offers a financial product under a regulated offer, which 
contains an omission which is materially adverse from the point of view of an investor, 
and the offeror does this with knowledge or recklessness as to whether such an omission 
is materially adverse, then that offeror commits a criminal offence.
30
 In addition, the 
offeror’s directors will criminally liable if the offer takes place with the directors’ consent 
and the directors know or are reckless as to whether the omission is materially adverse 
from the perspective of an investor.
31
 The Bill repeals s 58 of the Securities Act 1978 
replaces it with these offences, which require knowledge or recklessness. 
 
The FMC Bill also sets out a civil liability scheme for particular contraventions of the 
Bill, empowering civil liability orders where there are breaches of ‘civil liability 
provisions’. Disclosure obligations are just one of a list of provisions that can attract civil 
liability if breached, also including fair dealing, governance, unsolicited offers, licensing 
and financial reporting provisions.
32
 Liabilities for contraventions are imposed on the 
issuer and also on persons “involved in a contravention.”
33
 In the case of defective 
disclosures, if an offeror has contravened this obligation, then every director of the 
offeror is also deemed to have contravened the defective disclosure provision.
34
 However 
the Bill provides a number of defences for contravention of civil liability provisions, 
notably a defence will be available for defective disclosure if a person proves they made 
all reasonable enquiries and after doing so, believed on reasonable grounds that there was 
no omission from the disclosure document or register entry.
35
 
 
  
29
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 65. 
30
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 488(1). 
31
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 488(1A). 
32
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 467. 
33
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 466. 
34
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 509A. 
35
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 482B(2). 
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Under the civil liability scheme, the court can make a declaration of contravention, which 
enables an applicant to bring an action for compensation.
36
 Also, the court may order 
pecuniary penalty orders, a payment made to the Crown, if the court is satisfied that a 
person has contravened or been involved in a contravention of a civil liability provision.
37
 
Notably, the court can make a pecuniary penalty order against a director if defective 
disclosure by an offeror occurs.
38
 
 
The Bill does not limit or diminish any liability under the Crimes Act 1961.
39
 It therefore 
remains open that s 220 will be available as an alternative source of liability against 
directors who deal with publically raised funds in breach of their trust deed. 
 
B Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill 
 
The CLPA Bill proposes amendments to the Companies Act 1993 and the Limited 
Partnerships Act 2008 for the purpose of enhancing rules relating to companies and 
limited partnerships’ governance, registration and more relevantly, criminal liability.
40
  
 
Two directors’ duties are relevant here, firstly the director’s duty to act in good faith and 
in the best interests of the company.
41
 What is meant by good faith is that the director 
must act honestly; doing what he or she subjectively believes is in the best interest of the 
company.
42
 Secondly, the Companies Act sets out that a director must not agree, cause or 
allow the business of a company to be carried on in a manner likely to create substantial 
  
36
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 469. 
37
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 471. 
38
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 471(5). 
39
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 2011 (342-2), cl 516. 
40
 Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (249) Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill (344-2), 
Commentary. 
41
 Companies Act 1993, s 131. 
42
 G Walker and others Commercial Applications of Company Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, CCH, 
Auckland, 2009) at [1403]. 
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risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors.
43
 This section’s objective is the protection 
of creditors. Both duties are currently owed only to the company.
44
 
 
The CLPA Bill proposes criminalisation of elements of these two directors’ duties. Under 
the Bill’s Supplementary Order Paper (SOP), if a director acts in bad faith towards the 
company, believes the conduct is not in the best interests of the company and knows or is 
reckless as to whether the conduct will cause serious loss to the company or benefit to a 
person who is not the company, then the director commits a criminal offence.
45
  
 
The SOP also amends s 380 of the Companies Act 1993 to include an offence based on 
the reckless trading provision, stating if a director agrees, causes or allows the business of 
the company to be carried on in a manner that causes serious loss to the company’s 
creditors, the director knows that a serious loss will be suffered as a result of business 
being carried on in that manner and the creditors concerned do not give prior consent to 
carrying on the business in that manner then the director commits a criminal offence.
46
  
 
 
IV Potential effects of the proposed changes 
 
A Tallentire v R  
1 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 
 
There would not likely be any change to the actions available against the directors of 
Capital under the proposed changes in the FMC Bill. This is because Tallentire did not 
  
43
 Companies Act 1993, s 135. 
44
 Walker and others, above n 42, at [1205]. 
45
 Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (249) Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill (344-2), cl 
4. 
46
 Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (249) Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill (344-2), cl 
4AAB. 
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contain any non-disclosure issue and also contained no likely breach of the fair trading 
provisions or any other provisions of the FMC Bill.  
 
2 Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill 
 
As stated, the CLPA Bill criminalises s 131 of the Companies Act 1993. In regards to the 
duty itself, a director must act in good faith and in what the director believes to be the 
best interests of the company. Acting in good faith means acting honestly and it is what 
the director subjectively thinks is in the best interests of the company that is relevant.
47
 
However, the court has stated that this subjective believe must be genuinely held.
48
  
 
The directors of Capital intentionally breached the trust deed they were bound by. They 
did not do this for the best interests of the company, but in the Numeria 1 transaction they 
did it for the purpose of allowing their parent company to record a capital gain, and 
distribute that capital gain to trusts associated to the directors.
49
 In the Clyde transactions, 
the purpose was to transfer control from Messrs Nichols and Douglas to Mr Tallentire.
50
 
The reasons they undertook these transactions were for personal gain. 
 
By undertaking transactions for purely personal benefit, the directors would likely have 
breached their duty owed to the company to act in good faith and in the best interests of 
the company. However to be criminally liable for such a breach, the action of the director 
must be done in bad faith towards the company, with belief it is not in the best interests of 
the company and knowing or being reckless as to whether the conduct will cause a 
serious loss to the company or benefit a person who is not the company.
51
  
 
  
47
 Walker and others, above n 42, at [1403]. 
48
 Robb v Sojourner [2007] NZCA 493. 
49
 R v Tallentire, above n 1, at [19]–[20]. 
50
 At [26]. 
51
 Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (249) Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill (344-2), cl 
4. 
13 
 
The directors likely undertook bad faith behavior. They all knew of the trust deed 
requirements and intentionally breached them,
52
 which was arguably dishonest. The 
directors also would have known that their actions would benefit persons who were not 
the company, namely the personal benefits the directors themselves gained through 
distributions to associated trusts and the transfer of control. In regards to whether the 
director believed the conduct was not in the best interests of the company, this subjective 
belief must be reasonably held.
53
 It is unlikely the directors would be able to argue they 
genuinely believed that breaching the trust deed for personal gain was in the best interest 
of the company. Resultantly it is very possible that the directors of Capital would be 
found criminally liable for the breach of duty. 
 
B Jeffries v R 
1 Financial Markets Conduct Bill 
 
Under the proposed changes in the FMC Bill, Lombard would be an “issuer” for the 
purposes of the FMC Bill.
54
 It would be issuing financial products
55
 which would require 
disclosure.
56
 An offer would be a regulated offer
57
 and would require a PDS and register 
disclosures.
58
 
 
As stated, an offeror must not offer or continue to offer a regulated financial product if 
there is an omission in the PDS or the register entry that is materially adverse from the 
point of view of an investor.
59
 If an offeror does make such an omission, then a director 
of the offeror will be criminally liable, provided the offer was made with the director’s 
  
52
 Tallentire v R, above n 1, at [84]. 
53
 Robb v Sojourner, above n 48. 
54
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill (342-2), cl 10. 
55
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill (342-2), cl 7.  
56
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill (342-2), cl 27. 
57
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill (342-2), cl 29. 
58
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill (342-2), cl 35. 
59
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill (342-2), cl 65. 
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authority and the director knew or was reckless as to whether such an omission would be 
materially adverse from an investor’s perspective.
60
 
 
The directors of Lombard distributed a prospectus and investment statement containing 
omissions as to material liquidity problems the company was suffering from. Notably, the 
lack of reliable forecasts about timing of repayments, the reduction of cash in hand and 
the omission of references to directors’ concerns about the liquidity problems created a 
misleading impression as to the company’s financial situation. The High Court found that 
investors would have assessed the risk of investing in Lombard’s debenture stock 
differently if they had been aware of the issues regarding Lombard’s liquidity.
61
 It was 
also stated that the directors believed that statements addressing the company’s liquidity 
were true at the time the prospectus was issued. Their view was that the loan managers 
had legitimate explanations for the non-compliance of repayment projections and thought 
that the monitoring of the accuracy of the loan repayment projections was something 
potential investors could trust the directors’ judgment for.
62
  
 
In regards to the FMC Bill, in the writer’s view it would be very difficult on the evidence 
to conclude that the directors knew that the omission of information regarding the 
liquidity problems would be materially adverse from the point of view of an investor. The 
directors knew of the liquidity issues and omitted that information.
63
 However this 
information was omitted because they subjectively thought that they could rely on the 
loan managers’ assurances as to late repayments and investors could trust the director’s 
judgment on the liquidity concerns.
64
 The directors’ thoughts about the liquidity of the 
firm were reflected in an email from the Chairman to another director, stating that in 
regards to liquidity, “we are sailing very close to the wind,”
65
  and further in the Board 
meeting approving the amended prospectus, where the Chairman reiterated the Board’s 
  
60
 Financial Markets Conduct Bill (342-2), cl 488(1A). 
61
 R v Graham [2012] NZHC 265 at [105]. 
62
 At [125]-[126]. 
63
 William Patrick Jeffries v R, above n 2, at [195]. 
64
 R v Graham, above n 61, at [125]-[126]. 
65
 William Patrick Jeffries v R, above n 2, at [49]. 
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support for management’s assurances.
66
 The knowledge that the Judge accepted was that 
they considered the statements addressing the liquidity of the company to be true despite 
the omissions identified.
67
 If they believed that the comments about liquidity were true, 
something they were to be trusted with and that repayments would eventuate because of 
the loan manager’s assurances, then it is highly unlikely that the prosecution would be 
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they also believed that not including this 
information would be materially detrimental to a potential investor. They relied on 
assurances and thought the information would be immaterial to investors; this is why the 
information was omitted. It is highly unlikely to conclude from this evidence that the 
directors would be found to have known that there was an omission in the disclosures 
which would be materially adverse from the point of view of an investor. 
 
Knowledge is not the only possible way to be found guilty for the offence under the FMC 
Bill. If a director is reckless as to whether there is an omission in the disclosures which is 
materially adverse from the view point of an investor then the director will be guilty. The 
test for recklessness is:
68
 
  
“A person is reckless if, (a) knowing that there is a risk that an event may result from 
his conduct or that a circumstance may exist, he takes that risk; and (b) it is 
unreasonable for him to take it having regard to the degree and nature of the risk he 
knows to be present.” 
 
This is the “subjective reckless” test, and it is the general rule in New Zealand that 
recklessness be given its subjective meaning.
69
 
 
The question that needs to be asked in regards to the Lombard directors would be: did 
they know that there was a risk that omitting information from the disclosures that would 
  
66
 At [52]. 
67
 At [188]. 
68
 R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695 (CA). 
69
 R v Tipple CA217/05, 22 December 2005. 
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be materially adverse from the point of view of an investor and was the risk of making 
such an omission reasonable to take?  
 
It can be argued that the directors must have been aware that there was a risk involved 
with not including the liquidity information, and the risk that omitting that information 
could been seen as materially adverse in the eyes of investors. This is evident in an email 
sent from the Chairman of the Board to another director, stating:
70
  
 
“Some of our exposures are difficult and dependent on a number of positive events 
occurring. If they do not, or there are delays, we run the risk of running out of cash... 
I would not want to be a party to any capital raising which misrepresents the true 
position” 
 
In appreciating the risk of running out of cash, the directors also turned their minds to the 
issue of misrepresenting information to investors. If a director is aware of the risk of 
misrepresenting liquidity information, then it follows that that they are also aware that if 
such a misrepresentation is made, recipients of the incomplete information will be to 
some extent deceived. Misrepresentation has consequences, and having knowledge of a 
risk of misrepresentation would arguably also imply knowledge of the risk of 
consequences associated with such a misrepresentation. Due to an acknowledgement of 
the risk of misrepresentation, it can be said that the directors must have, to some extent, 
been aware that such a misrepresentation could lead to a materially adverse result from 
the point of view of an investor.  
 
The arguments of whether it was reasonable to take the risk of omitting the information 
are finely balanced. On one side, it is not a court’s position to be second guessing 
directors’ decision-making, and the court should arguably be conservative when it comes 
to deciding whether commercial risks are reasonable or not. The long title of the 
Companies Act 1993 specifically allows directors a wide discretion in matters of business 
  
70
 William Patrick Jeffries v R, above n 2, at [49]. 
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judgment.
71
 However, as no business judgment rule operates in New Zealand, there is no 
rule or presumption that absolves liability for business decisions made in good faith.
72
 
This leaves the question of reasonableness wholly in the hands of the court. 
 
It has been held that directors should not be penalised simply for taking risks, only those 
which are illegitimate.
73
 In addressing whether a business risk is illegitimate, the court 
weighs up a number of relevant factors, including whether the conduct was in accordance 
with orthodox commercial practice, how serious the risks were in the particular context 
and whether creditors had full notice of risks being taken with their funds.
74
 It is very 
possible for a court to say that taking the risk of not including the information was a 
reasonable thing to do; taking into account the fact that the directors believed the liquidity 
position would improve in the future and that they were in a much better position to judge 
the liquidity position of their company. An objective director in the same position may 
have very well made the same decision.  
 
Conversely however, the Court of Appeal stated that believing the statements to be true 
despite the omission was unreasonable.
75
 If believing the statements are true is 
unreasonable, then it is arguable that the risk associated with omitting the information is 
also unreasonable. Factors the court could look at in assessing reasonableness would be 
similar to ones the Court of Appeal did, namely reliance on managers, professional 
advisors and that the directors could be trusted to make decisions on liquidity matters. 
The Court held that these were unreasonable.
76
 If these arguments were the ones used to 
show the risk was reasonable, they would fail, leading to the possible result that omitting 
liquidity information would be an unreasonable risk. 
 
  
71
 See Companies Act 1993 Long Title, para (d). 
72
 J Farrar and others Company and Securities Law in New Zealand (Thompson Brookers, Wellington, 
2008) at ch 15.7. 
73
 South Pacific Shipping Limited (in Liquidation), Re; Traveller & Anor v Löwer (2004) 9 NZCLC 
263,570. 
74
 At [125]. 
75
 William Patrick Jeffries v R, above n 2, at [198]. 
76
 William Patrick Jeffries v R, above n 2, at [189]. 
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The prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was unreasonable 
to take the risk of omitting the material information, a difficult thing to prove. Because 
the arguments seem to be so finely balanced, it does not seem likely the Crown would be 
able to do this, therefore making it likely that the directors would be not guilty under the 
reckless element.  
 
The directors however would not be without consequence for their omission. As the 
offeror would have contravened cl 65 by omitting information that would be materially 
adverse to a potential investor, it would have contravened a civil liability provision.
77
 As 
directors of the offeror, they are treated as contravening defective disclosure requirements 
if the offeror does.
78
 This would mean all the directors would prima facie have 
contravened cl 65 and be subject to civil liability orders. The court could make a 
declaration of the contravention,
79
 thereby enabling an aggrieved investor to bring an 
action for compensation, and it could make a pecuniary penalty order.
80
 The director 
would have a number of defences available, but these would not likely be satisfied. The 
defences depend on reasonable reliance
81
 or belief on reasonable grounds there was no 
omission.
82
The Court of Appeal specifically stated reliance and belief in the case were 
not reasonable.
83
Therefore, although possibly not criminally liable, the directors would 
likely have civil liability imposed upon them for the omission of relevant information. 
2 Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill 
 
The CPLA Bill would criminalise the director’s duty to act in good faith and in the best 
interests of the company. Based on case law that has interpreted the s 131 duty, what is 
meant by “good faith” is that the director must act honestly, a subjective test looking at 
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what the director thinks will be in the best interest of the company.
84
 New Zealand 
requires that beliefs that underpin the decisions must be reasonably held, introducing an 
objective element.
85
  
 
For the criminal provision to apply the prosecution must establish bad faith behavior 
towards the company, belief the conduct is not in the best interest of the company, and 
knowledge or recklessness as to whether the conduct will cause serious loss to the 
company or benefit to a person who is not the company.
86
 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that omitting the information was done in bad faith. 
Conversely, the Court of Appeal accepted that the directors honestly believed that the 
statements accurately reflected the relevant liquidity information relating to the 
company.
87
  
 
The prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that that directors 
believed the omission would not be in the best interests of the company.  However the 
reason the amended prospectus and investment statements were distributed were to raise 
funds to get through the period of suffering liquidity and to keep the company from 
becoming insolvent. The directors believed that the statements were true.
88
 They also 
believed they should not be overly pessimistic as to the liquidity concerns, as this could 
have “disastrous consequences” on existing investors.
89
 The reasons for the omission 
were for the continuation of Lombard and it would be extremely difficult for the 
prosecution to prove that the directors believed omitting the information was not in the 
best interests of the company with the amount of evidence that suggests the contrary.  
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There is no evidence of the directors having knowledge that omitting the information 
would cause serious loss to the company or benefit someone that was not the company. 
Recklessness requires the subjective appreciation of a risk and the running of that risk 
which is deemed objectively unreasonable.
90
 For reasons stated in the FMC Bill analysis 
above, there must have been some subjective appreciation by the directors of a risk to the 
company by the omission. However it is unlikely that the prosecution would be able to 
prove the directors subjectively appreciated the risk that their conduct would cause 
serious loss to the company.
91
 
 
Due to the prosecution likely not being able to prove the elements of the offence, the 
exclusion of the information would not result in criminal liability under this proposed 
change.   
 
The Bill also criminalises elements of the reckless trading provision by amending s 380 
of the Companies Act 1993. A director must not agree to or cause or allow the business 
of the company to be carried on in a manner that causes serious loss to the company’s 
creditors, the director must know that a serious loss will be suffered as a result of 
business being carried on in that manner and the creditors that suffered the loss did not 
give prior consent to carrying on the business in that manner.
92
 Creditors will suffer 
‘serious losses’ if a loss is of a kind more significant than a material loss.
93
 While clear 
that directors must consider the interests of existing creditors when insolvent or nearly 
insolvent,
94
 it has also been held that the duty may extend to interests of future or 
prospective creditors.
95
 
 
  
90
 R v Stephenson, above n 68. 
91
 Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (249) Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill (344-2), cl 
4(c). 
92
 Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (249) Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill (344-2), cl 
4AAB. 
93
 Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (249) Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill (344-2), 
Explanatory note.  
94
 Gray v Wilson [1998] 8 NZCLC 261,530. 
95
 Fernyhough v Rankin Nominees Limited [1998] 8 NZCLC 261,623. 
21 
 
In regards to the first element of the offence, the focus is not the directors’ beliefs, but 
rather the manner in which a company’s business is carried on.
96
 The manner in which 
Lombard was carried on was that directors relied upon loan managers’ assurances as to 
liquidity.
97
 There was a sharp deterioration and constant downward trend in the 
company’s cash position, a pattern of serious delays in the recovery of loan repayments 
and significant discrepancies between projected timing of repayments and actual 
payment.
98
 Here, the directors allowed the business to be conducted in a way that caused 
serious to their current creditors and prospective creditors. They allowed offer documents 
to be distributed to potential creditors, omitting information which should have been 
known to the directors and should have been told to the creditors. The company’s 
liquidity was heading in a very concerning direction and not informing potential creditors 
of this caused them significant financial loss. The directors also failed to take a more 
intensive look into the loan exposures they had and merely relied on management, 
conducting the business in a way which caused substantial loss to existing creditors. 
 
However the offence requires the directors know that a serious loss will be suffered by the 
company’s creditors as a result of the business being carried on in such a manner. The 
prosecution would have to prove the Lombard directors knew the creditors would suffer 
losses from not including the liquidity information and by not taking a more intensive 
look into loan exposures. Nothing on the fact suggests that the Lombard directors knew 
this. Conversely, they believed the statements were true
99
 and made the statements to 
avoid losses to creditors.
100
 Arguably, they had no definite knowledge that creditors 
would suffer losses from their conduct, and in fact, thought their conduct would benefit 
the creditors. Because of this, the second element of the offence would likely be 
unsatisfied and the Lombard directors would not be found criminally liable for their 
omission under this proposed change.  
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V Current law vs. proposed changes – Discussion  
A Securities Act 1978 and Financial Markets Conduct Bill 
1 Knowledge 
 
Instead of being guilty for simply omitting information, the directors under the proposed 
changes in the FMC Bill must know that their omission will be materially detrimental for 
prospective investors. This would be dishonest conduct, with a director making the 
conscious choice to mislead potential investors, knowing they will be worse off because 
of it. It would be an abuse of the position the director holds, as a fiduciary. This was not 
the type of conduct which occurred in Jeffries. The directors were not acting dishonestly; 
they omitted information because they honestly believed the prospectus to be true. At the 
time the offer documents were distributed they believed that they would get through the 
period of tight liquidity. They omitted the information for what they saw as the best 
interests of the company, and in turn, the best interests of the investors. They made a 
business decision which turned out to be the wrong decision, and were held to be 
criminally liable because of it.  
 
Strict criminal liability for honest behavior seems inherently wrong. Knowledge of acts or 
omissions having an adverse effect on potential investors is arguably the appropriate level 
to set the threshold for criminal liability. A director of a finance company has the 
potential to do great financial harm to people due to the position that they occupy. But 
directors should not be held criminally liable for merely taking risks with honest 
intentions. Criminal liability for finance directors should be reserved for acts which 
encompass dishonesty, with the director subjecting the interest of investors to their own 
illegitimate purposes. 
 
The new standard set in the FMC Bill encompasses this idea, and the prospective change 
would mean that directors would have a better chance of being protected from criminal 
liability for acts or omissions done which are free of dishonesty, as seen by the likely 
result of Jeffries. 
23 
 
 
2 Recklessness 
 
The Bill also includes criminal liability for being reckless. Although this may appear a 
significant move from the present strict liability offence under s 58, this shift is less than 
it seems.  
 
The defence to a charge under the current s 58 asks if the director had reasonable grounds 
to believe that the prospectus was true.
101
 The test for recklessness asks whether it was 
unreasonable to run that risk.
102
 Both tests bring an element of objectivity, being: was it 
unreasonable to believe it was true and was it unreasonable to run the risk.  What this 
does is places the burden on the court to decide whether it was unreasonable. In Jeffries, 
the court said that relying on assurances and thinking that potential investors could trust 
the directors’ judgment was unreasonable.
103
 This was accepted on the balance of 
probabilities. In regards to the potential change, it must be proved that running the risk 
was unreasonable beyond reasonable doubt. Although this standard is higher, the test is in 
effect the same as that to satisfy the s 58 defence. This begs the question of whether the 
reform serves any purpose by the inclusion of a reckless standard, if the test is in effect 
the same. 
 
Recklessness is arguably not an appropriate level of fault for directors to be criminally 
liable for omissions in offer material. For recklessness, what is relevant is whether 
directors knew of the risk of the omission being materially adverse. In a commercial 
setting, risk is normal and will always exist. Running the risk needs to be unreasonable, 
but this in itself poses problems. What may be reasonable or unreasonable is 
circumstantial and no decisive test could be constructed to determine commercial 
reasonableness. Directors have the job of making the decisions, balancing financial 
factors and the duties they owe under various statutes and the court has said that this is a 
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finely balanced exercise which it is the director’s job to do.
104
 Yet the court is then 
expected to determine whether such a finely balanced decision was reasonable or not. It 
may be perfectly reasonable for directors in risky situations to decide one way or the 
other, and placing this decision under objective inquiry can blur the line between 
conscious wrongdoing and negligence, misjudgment and other examples of simply 
getting it wrong.
105
 Although not likely, it would be possible for the Lombard directors to 
be found guilty if the court could prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was unreasonable 
to run the risk, a conclusion that seems to undermine the purpose of the proposed 
legislative change. 
 
B Companies and Limited Partnerships Amendment Bill 
1 Section 131 
 
The criminal offence relating to a breach of the duty in s 131, to act in good faith and in 
the best interests of the company, would unlikely be breached in respect to the Lombard 
directors. This is due to the fact that there was likely no dishonest behavior or subjective 
appreciation that loss would result from their conduct.  
 
Such a result would enhance the purpose the FMC Bill is trying to establish, being 
criminal liability for intentionally dishonest conduct. The need for bad faith behavior 
means only dishonest conduct will be criminal, further strengthened by subjective 
appreciation that conduct was not in the best interests of the company and would cause 
serious loss to the company. The offence steers away for objectively imposed criminal 
liability and seems to promote the idea that dishonesty is what is relevant to be able to 
find a company director liable. It sits comfortably with only criminalising the most 
egregious conduct. 
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The Court of Appeal stated obiter that the obligation to ensure disclosure documents are 
true overrides the duty the directors owe to the company to act in the best interests where 
the duties conflict.
106
 By adhering to the duty to ensure disclosure documents are true, 
serious loss to the company can occur, for example overstating liquidity concerns could 
result in low investment and cause the premature demise of a company. While this means 
that directors will at times act in a manner that is arguably not in the best interests of the 
company and where they potentially know their conduct will cause serious loss, adhering 
to disclosure requirements correctly cannot be said to be bad faith behavior towards the 
company. Where the two duties conflict a breach of the duty to act in the best interests of 
the company may occur. However no criminal liability would occur under the CLPA Bill 
from these conflicting duties due to the need to have bad faith behavior.   
 
The proposed amendment to s 131 would criminalise dishonest behavior, as directors 
acting in bad faith for personal benefit would be guilty of the offence. But this type of 
offence already exists, and there is arguably no gap in which the criminalisation is 
filling.
107
 This is evident in situations such as in Tallentire. Section 220
108
 holds directors 
guilty when they know they are breaching the investor’s interest, and act in favor of their 
own interests. This case is just one example of current law already holding directors 
criminally accountable for their known breaches of the trust position in which they hold. 
Other statutory sections such as obtaining a benefit or causing loss by deception,
109
 
making false statements by a promoter,
110
 fraudulent use or destruction of property,
111
 
falsify records with intent to defraud,
112
 and knowingly carry on business with intent to 
defraud creditors
113
 are just a few examples of current criminal charges that already exist 
to do the job that the criminalisation of s 131 aims to do. It begs the question whether 
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such a proposed change will have any impact of the current criminal regime at all, or 
whether it will merely complicate the area of law which seems to be, with Tallentire as a 
prime example, doing its intended job already.  
 
2 Section 380 
 
The amendment to s 380 of the Companies Act 1993
114
 is a lot less concerning than the 
originally proposed criminalisation of s 135, a section which has been criticised by 
virtually every commentator who has discussed it.
115
 
 
However the first part of the offence retains some issues. By looking specifically at how 
the company conducts itself, it remains open that this part of the offence can be satisfied 
with less than dishonest behavior. A director who negligently allows the company to be 
carried on in a way which causes loss to creditors will satisfy the first part of the offence. 
This issue is however rectified by the second part of the offence; due to the director 
needing to have knowledge that the creditors will suffer serious loss. This subjective 
inquiry means that negligent and reckless conduct will not impose criminal liability under 
this section, reserving it only for intentionally dishonest behavior. This again fits with the 
idea of only criminalising the most egregious conduct. 
 
Another issue with the offence is that it requires serious loss by the creditors to actually 
occur.
116
 What this means is that the section cannot be used as a preemptive attempt to 
stop a business being carried on in a way likely to cause loss to creditors. Whilst 
replacing “substantial risk”
117
 with actual serious loss is arguably a change for the better, 
what this means is the criminal offence is now more of a punishment for directors rather 
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than being a protection for creditors. With the only sanctions under this offence being 
imprisonment and a fine,
118
 the creditors themselves are limited as to the effectiveness of 
this proposed change. 
 
The intention behind the criminalisation of these directors’ duties was that there was no 
public enforceability of the duties.
119
 The enforcement that existed was by the company 
itself and by way of derivative actions of shareholders.
120
 However, New Zealand now 
has the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) that can take actions against a company that 
issues securities to the public,
121
 specifically for a breach of duty.
122
 If public 
enforceability was the objective of the criminalisation of director duties, and this has been 
done by the creation of the FMA, then the question must be asked if the criminalisation of 
these duties is necessary at all. Australia has criminalised provisions similar to ss 131 and 
135,
123
 however the type of breaches that attract the use of those sanctions are where 
directors are knowingly and intentionally dishonest,
124
  rather than merely taking risks. 
 
VI Civil liability regime 
A Civil liability vs. criminal liability 
 
Criminal law inherently risks the autonomy of the individual. Over-using such a 
mechanism can be extremely risky to society. Deterrence and accountability should 
arguably be done in a way that is the least restrictive. This is what the FMC Bill aims to 
do, moving away from the strict criminal offences to a regime which places emphasis on 
civil liability, reserving criminal charges for the most egregious types of behavior.  
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Criminal law should be certain; however the proposed changes do not sit well with this 
idea. The recklessness element of cl 488
125
 places criminal liability at the discretion of the 
courts based on what they deem to be an ‘unreasonable risk.’ Furthermore, the 
requirement of actual loss in the amendment of s 380
126
 places severe limits on the 
offence’s usefulness. Such issues within the proposed changes beg the question whether 
criminal sanctions are appropriate at all. 
 
The civil liability regime within the FMC Bill is vast. The court has wide powers in 
breaches of civil liability sections, such as ordering compensation, pecuniary penalties 
and making banning orders against directors.
127
 Such liability should act as a deterrent 
and sufficient penalty for breaches which were either innocent or due to the director’s 
negligence, imposed upon a director as a deemed contravention.
128
 This point is 
illustrated through the likely result of Jeffries, where the less than dishonest conduct 
would have brought about the consequence of a contravention of cl 65
129
, bringing about 
civil liability. Such liability, without attaching the stigma of being a ‘criminal’ would still 
deter and penalise actions such as theirs. The regime provides a sensible middle ground 
and is arguably more appropriate than across-the-board criminal sanctions. As the orders 
are more flexible, the actual harm done can be compensated more efficiently, better 
taking victims’ rights into account and there are a range of defences available. 
 
Academics argue as to whether civil or criminal penalties lead to more effective and 
efficient enforcement of obligations that directors owe, with some commentators 
questioning whether civil penalty proceedings actually prevail over criminal 
proceedings.
130
 Of course in cases of dishonesty, criminal sanctions will be appropriate, 
but in more questionable cases, such as R v Jeffries, it remains open to argument that a 
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civil liability regime is in fact a better mechanism to deal with and deter conduct of that 
type. 
 
B Problems within the civil liability regime 
 
The civil liability regime of the FMC Bill does have some issues. Liability arises by 
contravening a civil liability provision, defined in the Bill.
131
 Civil liability orders can be 
ordered for a contravention or for involvement in a contravention,
132
 which is also 
defined by the Bill.
133
 This means that all others ‘involved’ in the contravention can be 
held liable and risk the very broad powers of the court’s civil liability orders. An 
employee, acting under direction, or a professional advisor, acting under a contractual 
obligation potentially can be held liable for the acts.
134
 Such a broad meaning can have 
unwanted and unnecessary consequences, such as liability for employees for innocent 
acts they are bound to do. The New Zealand Law Society argues it also has the potential 
to undermine the relationships between issuers and their advisors and create an 
increasingly inefficient securities market.
135
  
 
Further problems are procedural issues in the context of civil proceedings, which arise 
from the fact that civil penalties are mixture of both civil remedies and criminal 
sanctions.
136
 Civil penalty proceedings within the Bill use the standard of proof of 
balance of probabilities.
137
 However this standard may be applied flexibly.
138
 The more 
serious the breach, the more evidence will be required before the standard is met, which 
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potentially elevates the civil standard of proof in civil liability proceedings.
139
 This means 
that the civil liability regime, potentially aimed at holding directors who are not 
dishonest, but still have done major harm, could shift to one which more looks like a 
criminal liability regime.
140
 Such a procedural rule could undermine the purpose of 
having a civil liability system and all the benefits that result because of it. 
 
VII Conclusion 
 
The current criminal liability regime for finance company directors is unsatisfactory. 
Guilty verdicts can arise from taking commercially questionable but honestly intentioned 
decisions, which if the coin landed on heads instead of tails, would have brought about no 
action at all. The FMC Bill looks to better protect directors. The introduction of mental 
elements which need to be satisfied prima facie looks to solve the problems associated 
with the current strict liability offence. However, the inclusion of the recklessness 
standard means criminality is to some extent at the opinion of the courts. An interpreter 
of law becomes a legislator, deciding what is and isn’t criminal based on the courts view 
of what is commercially appropriate. Such a finely balanced inquiry in the past has been 
avoided by Commonwealth courts,
141
 and would serve as New Zealand’s mandate in 
regards to finance company directors.  
 
The criminalisation of directors’ duties seems to serve a more appropriate purpose. It 
criminalises conduct which is intentionally dishonest and better fits within the idea of 
reserving criminal sanctions for only the most egregious conduct. However the need for 
such criminalisation is questionable, with criminal sanctions already in place to cover the 
supposed ‘gap’ the CLPA Bill is attempting to fill.  
 
Dishonest conduct, for self-serving purposes and at the expense of innocent and trusting 
investors should not be tolerated in society and deserves criminal ramifications. But for 
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conduct which occupies the grey area, should honest or legitimate conduct have the same 
consequences? Parliament looks to answer such a question, but seems undecided, with 
Bills progressing through Parliament pulling liability toward both sides of the argument. 
The passing of both Bills would leave the criminal liability regime in a confused state, 
with potential over-charging and uncertainty issues. For a directional change aimed at 
“deterring dishonest conduct”,
142
 the actual results of the proposed changes do not 
completely conform to this.   
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